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COMMENTS
The cases in this field require "more exacting judicial scrutiny"42
and a "correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. ' 43 It is
not suggested that the Court should turn the Bill of Rights into
a "suicide pact"; 44 but the Court might well re-examine Justice
Stone's footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,45 and,
where legislation affecting civil liberties is involved, allow "nar-
rower scope for the presumption of constitutionality. '46
John M. Shaw
Discontinuance and Nonsuit
Common Law
In the early common law, a plaintiff could escape an impend-
ing adverse judgment by means of two procedural devices, dis-
continuance and nonsuit. The effects of these were sinfilar and
the terms "discontinuance" and "nonsuit" were sometimes ap-
plied interchangeably.
The term "discontinuance" originated in the law of real
property and was first used in pleading and practice' to denote
plaintiff's failure to proceed with his suit from day to day.2
Later the term was applied to any actual discontinuance of
plaintiff's suit, whether voluntary or by order of court. One
noted authority stated that the plaintiff was allowed to discon-
tinue his suit as a matter of right prior to commencement of
trial but could only discontinue it with leave of court after argu-
ment or demurrer.3 Defective pleading or failure to prosecute
the suit in due course was cause for involuntary discontinuance. 4
The effect of a discontinuance was to put the parties out of
court, to charge plaintiff with payment of costs, and to compel
him to begin de novo should he decide to renew his demand. 5
42. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938).
43. Id. at 153, n. 4.
44. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949).
45. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See page 179 supra.
46. Id. at 152, n. 4.
1. Head, History and Development of Nonsuit, 27 W.VA. L.Q. 20 (1920).
2. 3 BL. COMM. 296 (2d ed. 1766).
3. 2 TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH AND COMMON
PLEAS 732 (2d Am. ed. 1828): "The rule to discontinue is a side-bar rule;
and may be had, as a matter of course, from the clerk of the rules in the
King's Bench, at any time before trial or inquiry .. "
4. STEPHEN, A TR ATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING 216 (3d Am. ed.
1875).
5. 2 TraD'S PRACTICE 732 (2d Am. ed. 1828).
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A nonsuit, obtained by the defendant, had, at early common
law, the same effect as a discontinuance. In cases where the
jury had deliberated and returned to the bar, but had not an-
nounced their verdict, the plaintiff was "demandable," or could
be called to appear, by the defendant.6 If the plaintiff did not
appear, the verdict could not be announced and the plaintiff was
said to be "nonsuit."7 If the trial was not by jury, the defendant
could, immediately prior to pronouncement of judgment by the
court, demand the appearance of the plaintiff, who was similarly
said to be nonsuit if he failed to comply. The practice of calling
the plaintiff prior to rendition of the verdict originated long
ago when the plaintiff was subject to amercement or fine on
the theory that he had lost his suit because his claim was
falseA8 Later it became the practice for the court itself to call
the plaintiff when he failed to make out his case.9
Thd principal difference between discontinuance and non-
suit was that a nonsuit could be obtained by the defendant as
a matter of right, but a discontinuance was obtainable by the
plaintiff after commencement of trial only at the discretion of
the court.10 If the plaintiff had been refused a discontinuance,
and the defendant felt that the verdict would be in his favor,
he could prevent a nonsuit by simply not calling the plaintiff
or by not requesting that a nonsuit be ordered.
Louisiana Law
Discontinuance or voluntary nonsuit. The projet of the Code
of Practice of 1825 does not indicate the source of its articles on
6. Some of the very early cases indicate that it was once the practice
to permit a nonsuit even after the verdict when the plaintiff was dissatisfied
with the amount of damages awarded. Head, History and Development of
Nonsuit, 27 W.VA. L.Q. 20, 23 (1920). This practice was abolished in 1400
by the statute of 2 HENRY IV, c. 7, which provided "That if the verdict pass
dgainst the plaintiff, that the same plaintiff shall not be nonsuited." Later
cases, however, held that this statute applied only to general verdicts that
passed upon the whole case, and that a plaintiff could still be nonsuited
after a special verdict. E.g., Washburn v. Allen, 77 Me. 344, 347 (1885).
7. 3 BL. COMM. 376 (2d ed. 1766).
8. Ibid.; 2 TIDD'S PRACTICE 916 (2d Am. ed. 1828).
9. The province of nonsuit was enlarged by the statute of 17 GEO. II,
c. 17 (1741), which provided ". . . that where any issue is . . . joined in any
action or suit at law . . . and the plaintiff or plaintiffs . . . shall neglect to
bring such issues on to be tried . . . , it shall and may be lawful for the
judge . . . at any time after such neglect, upon motion made in open court,
(due notice thereof having first been given thereof,) to give the like judg-
ment for the defendant or defendants in every such action or suit, as in
the case of nonsuit."
10. Lamb v. Greenhouse, 59 Pa. Super. Ct. 329, 332 (1914).
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discontinuance. However, in several cases1 ' decided prior to the
enactment of the code, the right of the plaintiff to discontinue
his suit in cases tried by jury was determined by applying the
common law as it existed under the Ordinance for the Northwest
Territory of 1787.12 In Pritchard v. Hamilton,3 decided in 1828,
it was said that the adoption of the Code of Practice had made
no change in the law of discontinuance.
The present Code of Practice permits discontinuance by the
plaintiff in cases tried without a jury at any stage of the pro-
ceedings prior to judgment.1 4 This provision has been applied
only to final judgments. 15 In cases tried by jury, Article 532
provides that the plaintiff is at liberty to discontinue his suit
"until the moment when the jury shall be about to withdraw."' 6
In Crocker v. Turnstall, decided in 1844, the Supreme Court
distinguished between a plaintiff's right to discontinue and his
right to obtain a voluntary nonsuit. There the plaintiff requested
a nonsuit after the defendant had introduced his evidence. The
court held that a party plaintiff "could not claim, as a right, to
be nonsuited" but could only discontinue.1" The distinction
appears to have been drawn because the court believed that
prescription would be interrupted by a judicial demand dis-
missed as of nonsuit at plaintiff's request. This distinction
appeared again in Yorke v. Allen, where the court said, "There
is no law requiring the Judge to render a judgment of nonsuit
on motion of the plaintiff."'" Since the decision of Dennistoun v.
Rist,19 however, discontinuance and voluntary nonsuit have been
treated as being essentially the same; the early cases disallowing
voluntary nonsuits have been explained on the basis of their
11. Chedoteau's Heirs v. Dominguez, 7 Mart.(o.s.) 490 (La. 1820) and
cases cited therein.
12. 1 STAT. 51, n. (a). This statute provided for trial by jury as at com-
mon law.
13. 6 Mart.(N.s.) 457 (La. 1828).
14. Art. 491, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870: "The plaintiff may, in every
stage of the suit previous to judgment being rendered, discontinue the suit
on paying the costs."
15. Wright v. United Gas Public Service Co., 183 La. 135, 162 So. 825
(1935).
16. Art. 532, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870: "The plaintiff, until the moment
when the jury shall be about to withdraw, is at liberty, on paying the costs,
to discontinue his suit; but if the plaintiff allow the jury to withdraw, before
discontinuing his suit, the verdict shall be binding on him."
17. 6 Rob. 354, 357 (La. 1844).
18. 20 La. Ann. 237, 238 (1868).
19. 9 La. Ann. 464 (1854).
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peculiar facts 20 but Crocker v. Turnstall2' was not expressly
overruled on this point until 1940.22
One potentially broad limitation on the plaintiff's right to
discontinue was the rule, established by the jurisprudence, that
a plaintiff could not discontinue his suit to the prejudice of any
"acquired right" of the defendant.23 The difficulty of applying
this rule lay in determining what was an "acquired right." For
example, Whittemore v. Watts 24 held that a plaintiff's discon-
tinuance could not defeat the right of an intervenor to obtain
a judgment where dismissal of the intervention had been ap-
pealed from prior to the discontinuance. That decision was
restricted to its facts and the rule it suggested was repudiated
in Walmsley, Carver & Co. v. Whitfield.25 The rule that an inter-
vention falls with the dismissal of the main demand was con-
sidered settled in St. Bernard Trappers' Ass'n v. Michel.26
Another variant of the "acquired right" limitation is that
the plaintiff may not, by discontinuing his suit, defeat the right
of a reconvening defendant to remain in court and prosecute the
reconventional demand.27 This has been explained, not as a
denial of the plaintiff's right to discontinue his suit, but as a
limitation on the effect of his discontinuance. 28 Since the recon-
ventional demand is regarded as a separate suit, even when in-
corporated in the answer, it seems proper that a plaintiff should
not be permitted to discontinue a "suit" filed by the defendant.
The plaintiff in reconvention may discontinue in the same man-
ner as an ordinary plaintiff.29
20. State ex rel. Gondran v. Rost, 48 La. Ann. 455, 19 So. 256 (1896).
21. 6 Rob. 354 (La. 1844).
22. Rives v. Starcke, 195 La, 378, 196 So. 657 (1940).
23. Barbara, Inc. v. Billelo, 212 La. 937, 940, 33 So.2d 689, 690 (1947): "It
is the settled jurisprudence of this court that a plaintiff may discontinue
his suit at any time prior to the rendition of judgment 'unless thereby some
acquired right of the defendant would be impaired.' [citing numerous cases]."
24. 7 Rob. 10 (La. 1844).
25. 24 La. Ann. 258 (1872).
26. 162 La. 366, 110 So. 617 (1926).
27. Breffeilh v. Breffeilh, 221 La. 843, 856, 60 So.2d 457, 462 (1952), and
numerous cases cited therein.
28. Rives v. Starcke, 195 La. 378, 389, 196 So. 657, 660 (1940), 3 LOUISIANA
LAW REviEW 457 (1941): "The rule, that the right of a plaintiff to discontinue
his suit at any time before judgment is rendered does not give him the
right in that way to dispose of a demand in reconvention that was filed
before the plaintiff moved to discontinue his suit, is merely an explanation
of the effect of the plaintiff's availing himself of his right under article 491
of the Code of Practice, and is not an exception to the rule stated in such
unqualified terms in the article of the Code."
29. Barbara, Inc. v. Billelo, 212 La. 937, 941, 33 So.2d 689, 690 (1947): "It
enjoys the status of an independent suit and, as such, is subject to all of
the rules of pleading relative to the petition, the defendant, quoad the
reconventional demand, becoming the plaintiff in this separate cause of
[VOL. XV
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In order to protect the defendant from being put out of
court unjustly through plaintiff's discontinuance, the courts have
taken a liberal view of what constitutes a reconventional demand.
In Rives v. Starcke ° a plea of acquisitive prescription urged
by the defendant in a petitory action was treated as a recon-
ventional demand for the purpose of limiting the plaintiff's
right to discontinue. Anything which can be considered as being
in the nature of, or analogous to, a reconventional demand seems
to suffice to prevent the plaintiff's discontinuance from defeating
the defendant's demand.31 Although the courts have been liberal
in their interpretation of what constitutes a reconventional
demand for these purposes, they have otherwise narrowed the
scope of the term "acquired rights." The decision in Breffeilh
v. Breffeilh32 seems to make it clear that "acquired rights" could
mean only the rights of the defendant arising out of a recon-
ventional demand. The plaintiff in that case sued his wife for
a divorce. She answered the suit and filed a reconventional
demand for alimony. Prior to judgment she moved to discontinue
the reconventional demand. The motion was denied by the lower
court, because it was thought that an "acquired right" of the
plaintiff (defendant in reconvention) would otherwise have been
impaired or prejudiced. The Supreme Court, on rehearing, held
that since the defendant's motion to discontinue the reconven-
tional demand did not affect the plaintiff's demand, no acquired
right would be prejudiced.
Another limitation on the plaintiff's right to discontinue was
established by the court in Succession of Baum,3 3 where the
rights of a plaintiff in a suit had been seized under a writ of
fieri facias. The plaintiff under those circumstances was not
permitted to discontinue his suit. The rule of this case was sub-
sequently adopted by the legislature.3 4
action and the plaintiff in the original suit becoming the defendant [citing
numerous cases]."
30. 195 La. 378, 196 So. 657 (1940).
31. For example, a plea of acquisitive prescription has been considered
equivalent to a reconventional demand, being "something more than a defense
to the suit .. " Id. at 384, 196 So. at 659.
32. 221 La. 843, 60 So.2d 457 (1952).
33. 11 Rob. 314 (La. 1845).
34. "The seizing creditor shall have a notice of seizure served upon the
parties to the suit, and the effect thereof shall be to give such seizing cred-
itor a lien or preference on whatever is realized by his debtor out of the
suit. After such notice of seizure the litigants cannot dismiss the suit or
make any valid sale, compromise or adjustment of the suit to the prejudice
of the seizing creditor or without his consent unless the amount to be
received by the debtor in the compromise is sufficient to satisfy the seizing
creditor's claim .. " La. Acts 1928, No. 85, § 2, p. 86, LA. R.S. 13:3865 (1950).
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Involuntary nonsuit. Article 536 of the present Code of
Practice provides that where the plaintiff does not appear after
the case has been set for trial, the defendant is entitled to a
judgment of nonsuit. This in effect subjects the plaintiff to
payment of costs, since a second suit on the same cause of action
is subject to the exception of res judicata when plaintiff cannot
show that he has paid the costs of the first suit.3 5
The Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4522 provides that failure
of the plaintiff to give proper security for costs upon demand
by the defendant is another ground for a judgment of nonsuit.36
A judgment of nonsuit is granted in the interests of justice
when the plaintiff fails to introduce sufficient evidence to prove
his case and it appears that he may later be able to supply the
deficiency.3 7 One of the recent decisions applying this rule is
Logan v. Schuler,38 where the plaintiff failed to prove that he
was entitled to commissions on the sale of insurance policies
because he was unable to produce a license to act as agent, a
statutory prerequisite to obtaining such commissions. Since he
could later obtain the license and satisfy the statutory require-
ment, a judgment of nonsuit was granted. This does not mean
that the court will allow defendant to be prejudiced in any
manner by a judgment of nonsuit under these circumstances.
If the defendant is able to establish a valid defense, he can obtain
a final judgment in his favor. 3
Conclusion
The Louisiana legislation allowing a plaintiff to discontinue
his suit at will exposes the defendant to abuse. Much of the
35. Art. 536, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870: "If, after the cause has been
set down on the docket for trial, the plaintiff does not appear, either in
person or by attorney, to plead his cause, on the day fixed for trial, the
defendant may require that judgment of nonsuit be rendered against such
plaintiff, with costs.
"But such judgment can not be pleaded, as res judicata, or in bar of
another suit, for the same cause of action, provided the plaintiff show that
he has paid the costs of the first suit."
36. LA. R.S. 13:4522 (1950): "The defendant before pleading ...may by
motion demand and require the plaintiff, third opponent or intervenor to
give security for the cost in such case, and on failure to do so within the
time fixed by the court such suit, third opposition or intervention, as the
case may be, shall be dismissed as in case of nonsuit. This section shall
not apply to the parish of Orleans and to cases brought in forma pauperis,
nor to the state or any political subdivision thereof." See also LA. R.S.
13:1215 (1950) applicable to Orleans Parish.
37. Logan v. Schuler, 220 La. 580, 57 So.2d 193 (1952); Arthur v. Dupuy,
130 La. 782, 58 So. 570 (1912); South Louisiana Land Co. v. Waterhouse, 128
La. 458, 54 So. 941 (1911); Kimball v. Dreher, 1 La. 208 (1830).
38. 220 La. 580, 57 So.2d 193 (1952).
39. Linman v. Riggins, 40 La. Ann. 761, 5 So. 49 (1888).
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expense incurred by him in the preparation of his defense can-
not be taxed as costs of court. He is not protected against frivol-
ous discontinuance unless he has filed a reconventional demand
or is otherwise able to show that he has an "acquired right" in
the suit.
The virtually absolute privilege of the plaintiff to discontinue
accorded by our statutes no longer exists in the English judicial
system, from which it was taken.40 It was found in the federal
system prior to the adoption of the new Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and it is allowed to remain in the law of many states
of the Union. 41 Under the new Federal Rules 42 a plaintiff may
cause the dismissal of his suit without leave of court at any
time prior to service of an answer or a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party. Thereafter, the granting of a
motion to dismiss without prejudice is within the discretion
of the court and subject to conditions which the court may deem
proper. A dismissal with prejudice operates as an adjudication
of the controversy on the merits. These features of the federal
practice might profitably be incorporated by the Louisiana legis-
lature in a revision of the articles of the Code of Practice relating
to discontinuance and nonsuit. Such legislation would permit
the courts to continue the salutary practice of rendering a judg-
ment of nonsuit where the plaintiff has failed to substantiate
his claim as a result of a deficiency of evidence which may be
remedied later. At the same time, it would rid the present law
on discontinuance and nonsuit of its inherent susceptibility to
abuse.
Carl F. Walker
40. Fox v. Star Newspaper Co. [1900] A.C. 19, 20: "Our whole system has
been changed, and I think the reason why the word 'nonsuit' itself is not
now to be found in the rules is that it was determined that the power of
a plaintiff at common law to claim a nonsuit, or the plaintiff in equity to
dismiss his bill at his own option, should no longer be permitted; and
it is probable that the word 'discontinuance' was supposed to apply to both
forms of procedure, both at common law and in equity. Accordingly, by
Order XXVI. r. 1, the only mode by which a plaintiff can submit to defeat
is under that order, unless he allows the proceedings to go on until the
verdict is recorded against him." See Note, 89 A.L.R. 13, 18 (1934).
41. Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming have statutes similar to the statutes in Louisiana on the subject
of discontinuance and nonsuit. Notes, 89 A.L.R. 13, 62 (1934), 126 A.L.R. 284,
294 (1940).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 41.
